The Bolivian events of last October bear historical significance: under the hammer blows of the uprising staged by the workers, the peasants and the people, combined with an indefinite general strike convened by the COB and the insurrection in El Alto, Sánchez de Lozada was finally toppled. He was the epitome of "neoliberalism" in Bolivia, a trustee of multinational corporations and imperialism. In this way, the first phase of a new revolutionary period has been ushered in, one that could be compared with that leading to the April 9 insurrection, the great upswing of the 1970s or the 1982-85 period. There are vital teachings to be learnt as well, which should help us prepare for the great struggles in the next period ahead. The article below charts the first balance sheet of the events and the perspectives for the future.
A national crisis
This momentuous turn is rooted in the deep crisis engulfing Bolivian capitalism after two decades of neoliberal plans, which have brought about a reinforced submission of the country to imperialist capital on an unprecedent scale, thus aggravating the plight of the already impoverished masses living in the cities and the countryside.
During 2000, when the "war for water" was raging in the city of Cochabamba, that revolt showed that the masses were starting to fight back after years of a rampant bourgeois and imperialist offensive. Two trends have unfolded since then.
First, a crisis of the bourgeois political regime. Already in 2000 it was clear that a deep gap was tearing apart policymakers and the people, or in the words of political comentators "the state and civil society". After Banzer"s resignation and subsequent death, the 2002 elections were an attempt at derailing the mass discontent and brigde that gap. But that experiment failed quite rapidly, and after February the gap just widened even more, until it became the political earthquake that rocked the country in October.
The second trend at work is the steady upswing of the masses. It was mainly peasant first, but then it spread to the cities, with the workers joining in through major struggles and events that have shaken the country to its foundations -such as the "war for water" in Cochabamba, the September 2000 blockades in the Highlands (Altiplano), the February days of this year and the October insurrection, which represents the amplest and deepest mass outburst in the last two decades.
Therefore, both the objective and subjective factors making up the "national crisis" or "general crisis" were simmering, until the mass outburst last October brought about a dramatic turn of the events, ushering in a new historical period of heightened class struggle.
A revolutionary situation
All in all, we believe that a new revolutionary process is unfolding now, which might possibly drag on for several years, going through a number of phases or distinct situations, with ebbs and tides. Decisive clashes loom ahead, between the forces of bourgeois and imperialist counter-revolution on one hand, and the those of a workers" and peasants" revolution, on the other.
Since the demonstrations and clashes on September 19 and 20, which marked the beginning of a whole month of turbulent and growing protests that peaked on October 17, a revolutionary situation has opened up. It is characterized by the crisis paralysing the ruling class and its regime, the steady upsurge of labor, the peasants and the people at large, the opposition stance taken by the middle layers and the radicalization of advanced layers.
Within this longer situation, the sharpest developments took place between the El Alto insurrection on October 11, 12 and 13 that defeated the attempted militarization, and the Presidential reshuffle on October 17. Those events clearly amounted to a revolutionary crisis, i.e., a paroxistic sharpening of the crisis of bourgeois power, with Goni"s government loosing control by the hour, and a general strike and the spontaneous insurrection in El Alto both putting de factothe question of power on the order of the day -who should rule the country, us or them?
General strike, mass uprisings and insurrection
The indefinite general strike convened by the COB at the Plenum held in Huanuni, in spite of being called without any previous preparation of the grassroots, provided an axis for the tidal wave of protests, demos, walk-outs, etc, that culminated in the October uprising.
Given the shaky situation, the civic strike in El Alto grew into a clash with the armed forces, moving on to become a local social insurrection, the most advanced element nurtured by the spontaneous actions of the masses. It gave fresh impetus to the "indefinite general strike", dragging La Paz into it and spreading and deepening the protests across the nation, with the demand for the resignation of the president becoming a central axis of the protests. A mass revolutionary upheaval across the nation was thus in the making, with the movement becoming a tidal wave that was also drawing fringes of the urban petty bourgeoisie into the fray.
The "indefinite general strike", to the extent that it is a mass political strike, poses the question of power on the order of day, but it is not able to work it out for itself. It must become an insurrection of the whole people. And this requires organs of power of the struggling masses, the creation of militias, and above all, a leadership that consciously stakes the bets right to the end, i.e., a revolutionary leadership. These three elements were by and large absent in October, to the effect of opening the door to political engineering in the Parliament, which appointed the new president and defused the mass uprising. The perspective of further clashes in the foreseeable future will make that party all the more necessary.
Embryonic dual power
As a matter of fact, two rival powers collided: a beleaguered state power, on one hand, which lost control over a significant part of the territory and the main urban concentration (particularly El Alto) for several days, and a power flowing from the workers" and people"s protests, on the other. The latter challenged established authority altogether, fighting it back on all terrains, never mind they failed to nurture material institutions representing it. The neighbors" juntas in El Alto objectively revealed those tendencies. Countless grassroots" meetings were held, to deal with a whole number of issues around the steps to follow in the struggle, particularly those concerning self-defense, although the spontaneous tide outdid them all the time. The District Juntas also reinforced centralization. The enormous authority and ascendancy gained by the FEJUVE (neighbor"s juntas front) and the COR (La Paz branch of the COB) flowed from this powerful drive among the rank-and-file.
In the heat of the people"s insurrection, a Commune in El Alto became a real possibility, which should have dealt with all the tasks concerning the mobilization, defense, flow of supplies, etc, thus becoming a powerful centralizing axis of the national uprising.
Those spontaneous tendencies among the masses, to take charge of all the problems afflicting them and oppose their own power to that of the bourgeois state, failed to develop any further. Worse still, after October 17, they have retreated. Not a single organ has arisen so far as a reflection of that inchoate dual power, to the effect of centralizing it, expanding it across the region and eventually the nation. The fast tempo of events, and above all, the stubborn opposition of the top leaders of the COB, the MAS, and the MIP prevented the emergence of organs for coordination and committees of struggle and mobilization.
However, the steps taken were a priceless experience of self-organization for the masses, which will facilitate the emergence of mass united front organs in the next period ahead.
A flare-up of civil war
The slogan for a "civil war" was first chanted in Warisata, and was then raised by sections of the vanguard, reflecting a willingness to challenge and defeat the government by any means necessary. In fact, since the first events of October, with the clashes and the ensuing carnages that lasted for several days, a civil war atmosphere was in the air, characterized by a physical and open -even armed- clash between protesters and the forces of the bourgeois state, in a move that outdid the framework of bourgeois legality.
The escalation of repression, instead of putting resistance down, unleashed a series of even more audacious measures by the mobilizing masses, which eventually led to the insurrection in El Alto. In spite of the dozens of casualties and the hundreds of injured protesters, the El Alto population defeated the attempted militarization of their neighborhood, taking over the territory and erecting thousands of barricades and digging also trenches with the aim of defending themselves. Thus, the first steps to self-organization were taken -vigilance committees were set up and the neighbors" juntas decided to go for self-defense brigades. Some people even made attempts at arming themselves. We should also highlight the behaviour of those advanced layers, such as the miners and other, who marched down to La Paz resorting to a spontaneous dynamic of "sieging and taking on" the headquarters and the symbols of power -in spite of the fact that the massive demonstrations in La Paz and other cities were mostly peaceful.
Therefore, El Alto and most of the city of La Paz, as well as the highlands surrounding La Paz, became "liberated areas" where the police could no longer get into. Some advanced actions, such as the destruction of a number of police stations and some motorbikes and vehicles of the armed forces, the attempts at blocking the circulation of fuel trucks en route to La Paz, and even sieging some barracks all show how high the fighting morale of the vanguard was.
A lot more might have been achieved
At the COB meeting and plenums of October 17 and 18 many delegates voiced anger and discontent: a lot more might have been achieved, but "something" was missing.
For all the fighting disposition and heroism displayed by the mobilizing masses; in spite of having driven the government against the wall, cornering it at the San Jorge presidential palace until it had to quit, no further steps could be taken in the direction of a workers" and peasants" government.
The bourgeois state might have been dislocated, to say the least, along with its fundamental institutions. Although the bourgeoisie would have been able to appoint a new government, it would have been much weaker, if that had been the case. A Constituent Assembly, convened after the wreck of the regime, might have also been convened , which would have accelerated the experience of the mass movement with their democratic aspirations, thus posing before them the task of taking power in their own hands as the only viable solution. Instead of the revolutionary crisis coming to an abrupt end, it would have dragged on for much longer, ushering in a phase of open fight for power in more favorable conditions for the mass movement. New organs for power would thus have been created, along with a new revolutionary "high command" to organize the insurrection.
The role of existing leaderships
If the process failed to unfold any further, the main responsibility lies in the main organizations active in the mass movement -the MAS, the MIP, the COB, which not only refused to set up strike and mobilization committees, or else other coordination bodies along democratic lines, in order to centralize the struggle, but also failed to prepare for a mobilization to bid for state power altogether. They openly betrayed the heroic mass upheaval under way, placing their bets on a solution within the rotten democratic regime.
The MAS, committed to the defense of bourgeois democracy and pursuing a strategy that boils down to winning the next elections, tried to hold down the protests as much as it could; they just raised the demand to "re-examine" the gas privatization project. Then, when millions were demanding that Sánchez de Lozada had to go, they jumped on the wagon and demanded his resignation and the appointment of a successor along constitutional lines, backing the negotiations pursuing the appointment of vicepresident Mesa. When he was finally appointed, they gave him a resounding although indirect endorsement (they have not got into the government).
The Mallku was exchanging messages with Goni"s ministers right when the protests were peaking, and for all its red-hot rhetoric, it ended up sharing a platform with Carlos Mesa before thousands of peasants, announcing a 90 day-long truce with the new president, thus sowing illusions that he might meet the burning needs of the rural population.
The COB (trade union federation) took a more fighting stance right from the beginning of the uprising, launching a general strike and demanding Goni"s resignation. However, Mr. Solares, the COB"s chairman, failed to deliver any political perspective for the workers. Quite otherwise, he raised his own variant of a "constitutional change" (through the Supreme Cout of Justice) and placed all his bets to exerting pressure on the establishment, eventually endorsing Mesa"s appointment. As a matter of fact, he has given a new lease of life to the new government.
All in all, they were all sworn enemies of raising any independent political perspective for the movement on the streets.
The constitutional change
Thanks to that, the ruling class made sure that Goni"s inevitable fall did not drag the whole political and institutional set-up with him. They were able to uphold "legality" through the appointment of fresh political personnel in the Executive Power, preserving the judiciary and the legislative power as well. The arrmed forces and the police, although weakened, were not torn apart, keeping internal cohesion. The role of institutions, and the institutions themselves, remained in place and the change of government proceeded along constitutional lines, being enacted by the Parliament (which met for an emergency meeting on the very day of October 17) with the participation of all political parties.
The bourgeoisie has been therefore able to capitalize on the uneven development of the process, which had its epicenter in La Paz and the Highlands (altiplano), with other regions such as Santa Cruz and Tarija remaining a bulwark of reaction.
In spite of the heavy blows delivered against the regime and state institutions, these were in a position so as to resort to the proceedings of bourgeois democracy (which had been eroded but were as yet useful to defuse the drive to a mass insurrection). The cooperation of the MAS and the main leaders also helped to stave off the revolutionary crisis, which worked out the vacuum of power -which lasted for two days, October 12 and 13- for the benefit of the ruling class.
Thus, although the powerful uprising of last October dealt a harsh blow indeed to the whole state edifice of bourgeois rule, it failed to bring it down. It has not inaugurated, then, a superior phase of a direct fight for power, i.e., it did not become an open revolution, in the style of that of April 9, 1952, or else the 1917 February revolution in Russia, when the masses brought down the tzar first and then moved on to take power themselves. However, it has altered the balance of forces between the ruling class and the masses in a fundamental way, inaugurating a situation with revolutionary traits, one in which new mass offensives will take place, with the question of state power a pending issue looming ahead too.
An unstable situation
Then, the ruling class and its government are forced to preside over this new and shaky situation. As the newly appointed president Mesa has just announced in his inauguration speech, he will seek to bring in a "transitional government" in order to prop up the tottering political regime and stave off the threatening pressure of the mass movement.
It is true that it can rely on the truce handed over by the MAS, the MIP and the COB, that the middle class has gone for support of Mesa, and that whole swathes of the population are trusting Mesa to a certain extent right now. But the land occupations staged by landless peasants are also showing that a fighting spirit lives on and the most burning needs might also lead to renewed clashes with the new government. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie has split up, with disputes that could also erode the fragile political statu quo that Mesa is busy trying to uphold.
The short term situation is deeply unstable. Will the attempted bourgeois revamping of the regime prevail, defusing the revolutionary upsurge, or else will the masses continue to be on the offensive?
The demands raised by protesters have not been met in the least: the fight for the defense of gas, for the land and the territory, for a pay rise and working conditions, for health and education, etc.
The mass movement has gone through a formidable experience of struggle, flexing its muscles through direct action. It will be very hard for the bourgeoisie to take it out of the scene and prevent new revolutionary outbursts.
This perspective cuts across the tasks of the next period ahead, above all that of building a new revolutionary leadership.